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Abstract 
 
‘Partnering’ is a co-operative arrangement in the construction industry which is 
commonly based on general expressions of trust, co-operation and good faith.  
However it seems that partnering parties can have negligible expectations that such 
general expressions will have any fiduciary content requiring them to moderate self-
interest or act in the interests of other parties. 
 
Where parties intend that either a general fiduciary relationship or specific fiduciary 
obligations should be created, it has been suggested that they should consider joint 
venture agreements and very careful drafting of contract obligations in order to 
achieve these intentions. 
 
This paper firstly examines the potential for fiduciary relationships to arise in joint 
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ventures generally and from the drafting of the ACA Standard Form of Contract for 
Project Partnering (PPC2000) in particular.   It then examines the possibility of 
distinct fiduciary obligations arising as a result of individual provisions of the 
PPC2000 contract form. 
 
It is concluded that joint ventures are not readily construed as fiduciary relationships 
and that whilst the PPC2000 partnering form is also unlikely to imply such a 
relationship, some individual provisions in it may have fiduciary content.      
 
Introduction 
 
The need for relationships based on trust, openness, good faith, etc between the 
contracting parties in the construction industry has been specifically encouraged by 
successive reports into the construction industry1 and this has resulted in the 
development of ‘partnering’ arrangements.   In his report “Constructing the Team” 
Sir Michael Latham described partnering as a formal agreement where “the parties 
agree to work together, in a relationship of trust, to achieve specific primary 
objectives”2.   Partnering agreements normally include general statements which 
express the parties’ commitments to trust, openness, common goals, etc.   These 
statements may be contained in a ‘partnering charter’ which can be agreed either 
                                                     
1 Eg Report of the Central Council for Works and Buildings chaired by Sir Ernest Simon, The 
Placing and Management of Building Contracts, (London: HMSO, 1944); Report of the Committee 
chaired by Sir Harold Banwell, The Placing and Management of Contracts for Building and Civil 
Engineering Work, (London: HMSO, 1964); Final report of the government/industry review of 
procurement and contractual arrangements in the U.K. construction industry by Sir Michael 
Latham, Constructing the Team (London: HMSO, 1994); The report of the construction task force 
chaired by Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction, (London: DETR, 1998). 
2 Final report of the government/industry review of procurement and contractual arrangements in 
the U.K. construction industry by Sir Michael Latham, Constructing the Team (London: HMSO, 
1994), p.62, para.6.43. 
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before or after execution of the formal contract.   Alternatively they can be contained 
within the contract itself.   In a recent paper the writer submitted that it is reasonable 
to suggest that parties to such arrangements will have some positive expectations of 
commitments to trust, etc which he described as ‘relational aspects’ and he suggested 
that these would include an expectation that the extent to which each party is entitled 
pursue their own self-interest would be moderated3.   However the writer concluded 
that, in a general sense, “parties to construction contracts can have negligible 
expectations that any judicial consideration will be given to the relationship covered 
by the term ‘partnering’ in any of its forms”4.     
 
More specifically the writer also concluded that, in relation to express commitments 
to relational concepts such as trust, etc in partnering arrangements, “the law, as it is 
currently applied, does not fit any positive expectations that the parties may have of 
moderation of self-interest as a result of the relational aspects of partnering 
arrangements.   Consequently parties would be advised to depend on very careful 
drafting of obligations if they expect these to contain any enforceable requirements in 
this regard”5.    
  
In ‘Rethinking Construction’ Sir John Egan proposed that those involved in the 
delivery of construction move beyond partnering and form long term alliances to 
identify and fulfil client’s needs6.   Mak has suggested that, since standard contract 
forms are unlikely to meet the needs of co-operative arrangements such as partnering, 
                                                                                                                                                  
3 Begg, ‘The Legal Content of Partnering Arrangements in the Construction Industry’ (2003) 8(3) 
Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 179 at p.181. 
4 Ibid. at p.196. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The report of the construction task force chaired by Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction, 
(London: DETR, 1998) at p.32, para.68. 
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an even more intensive relationship is required.   He suggests that one approach is for 
a project owner to enter into a ‘legally binding joint venture’ with a managing 
contractor who is a single delivery entity consisting of the constructor and 
consultants7.   
 
The Association of Consultant Architects has taken a different approach.   They have 
published a standard form of project partnering contract known as PPC20008 which 
they consider is consistent with the guidance on co-operative relationships in 
construction contained in the Egan Report.   Currently PPC2000 is the only standard 
form of contract available for multi-party partnering arrangements in the construction 
industry.  The form contains a range of obligations drafted in a manner designed to 
encourage the parties to work together in a relationship of trust and openness. 
  
There is a question, therefore, concerning the extent to which these approaches may 
either create relationships which legally require general moderation of self-interest in 
the interests of other parties, or may create specific and enforceable obligations in 
this regard.   This paper, therefore, examines the following in relation to the law of 
England and Wales and the law of Scotland: 
 
• the extent to which joint ventures may result in relationships which legally 
require the parties to act generally in the interests of other joint venture parties 
• the extent to which the relationship created by the PPC2000 partnering 
contract may result in a general enforceable obligation to moderate self-
                                                                                                                                                  
7 Mak, Bevis, ‘Partnering and Alliancing’, (2001) 17(3) Const L J 218 at p.227. 
8 The ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering (PPC2000), drafted by Trowers & 
Hamlins in association with The Association of Consultant Architects Ltd (2000). 
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interest in the interests of other parties 
• the extent to which particular provisions in the PPC2000 partnering contract 
may create specific enforceable obligations to moderate self-interest in the 
interests of other parties. 
 
Methodology 
 
The analysis is based on consideration of rules of law, recent judicial decisions and 
academic comment.   Because trust-based relationships in construction of the form 
envisaged by Latham and Egan are a relatively recent development in the UK, 
relevant cases and comment are limited.   In fact there is currently only one reported 
case involving a partnering relationship in the construction industry in the UK9.  
Consequently cases and comment in other related jurisdictions are considered.   In 
particular the writer has noted a more extensive history of co-operative relationships 
in the Australian construction industry and the historical relationship between 
Australian and English law.   However he also points out that Australian law has 
moved in the direction of recognising a general duty of good faith in contracts 
whereas English and Scots law have not.   Consequently he concludes that although 
the relevance of Australian decisions and comment requires to be critically analysed 
in each case, they can be helpful in analysing potential attitudes in English and Scots 
law10. 
 
Similarly comment on American law can provide some useful indications in relation 
                                                     
9 Birse Construction Ltd v St David Ltd [2000] WL 1421182 (QBD(T&CC), 78 Con LR 121; Birse 
Construction Ltd v St David Ltd [2000] WL 1421182 (QBD(T&CC) (No. 1998 TCC No.419). 
10 Begg, ‘The Legal Content of Partnering Arrangements in the Construction Industry’ (2003) 8(3) 
Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 179 at p.183. 
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to English and Scots law. 
 
It is submitted that the analysis will be applicable to both English and Scots law 
because whilst these jurisdictions have evolved from distinct origins, their general 
approaches to the rules concerning freedom of contract and certainty of enforcement 
are similar.   In this respect McBryde suggests that “(i)f anything, the modern 
tendency in (Scottish) contract law has been to accept English authority if it is 
relevant.   Thus in any argument about, for example, offer and acceptance 
incorporation of terms in a contract, implied terms or repudiation or recission of a 
contract, English cases will be freely cited.”11.    
 
Moderation of self-interest 
 
Finn provides the following definitions in respect of the legitimate pursuit of self-
interest: 
 
“‘Unconscionability’ accepts that one party is entitled as of course to act self-
interestedly in his actions towards the other.   Yet in deference to that other’s 
interests, it then proscribes excessively self-interested or exploitative conduct.  
‘Good faith’, while permitting a party to act self-interestedly, nonetheless 
qualifies this by positively requiring that party, in his decision and action, to 
have regard to the legitimate interests therein of the other.   The ‘fiduciary’ 
standard for its part enjoins one party to act in the interests of the other – to act 
                                                     
11 McBryde, William, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: W Green, 2001), p.10, 
para.1.26. 
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selflessly and with undivided loyalty.   There is, in other words, a progression 
from the first to the third: from selfish behaviour to selfless behaviour.”12. 
 
This paper is not concerned with unconscionable conduct.   However it is relevant to 
examine the progression from the good faith standard to the fiduciary standard of 
behaviour, since the term good faith is frequently used in cases where there is a 
dispute over whether conduct by the parties is consistent with the legitimate pursuit 
of self-interest. 
 
‘Good faith’ is described by Lucke as having “not one but many meanings, as well as 
the unusual capacity to acquire expanded and altogether new meanings”13.    
 
Legislators, judges and legal commentators in various jurisdictions have offered a 
variety of approaches to defining good faith in commercial transactions.   Many of 
these definitions are in two parts consisting of a basic threshold standard 
accompanied by a further content which depends on context.   The threshold standard 
is frequently expressed in terms of the exclusion of certain basic types of ‘bad faith’ 
conduct such as dishonesty, deliberate misrepresentation and deliberate 
exploitation14.   This basic standard is reflected in the American Uniform Commercial 
                                                                                                                                                  
12 Finn, P D, The Fiduciary Principle in Youdan, T G (ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver: Carswell Co. Ltd, 1989), p.4. 
13 Lucke, H K ‘Good Faith and Contractual Performance’ in Finn (ed) Essays on Contract (The 
Law Book Co Ltd, 1987), p.160. 
14 See Nehf, James, ‘Bad Faith Breach of Contract in Consumer Transactions’ in Brownsword, 
Roger, Hird, Norma J and Howells, Geraint (eds), Good Faith in Contract:  Concept and Context 
(Aldershot:  Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1999), pp 124-125; Stapleton, J, ‘Good Faith in 
Private Law’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 1 at p.8; Kovach, K, ‘Good Faith in Mediation – 
Requested, Recommended or Required? A New Ethic’ (1997) 38 South Texas Law Review 623, 
para.(k); Steyn, J, ‘Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 113 LQR 433 at 
p.438; Wightman, John, ‘Good Faith and Pluralism in the Law of Contract’ in Brownsword, Roger, 
Hird, Norma J and Howells, Geraint (eds), Good Faith in Contract:  Concept and Context 
(Aldershot:  Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1999), pp 42-46. 
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Code (1977)  which provides a statutory definition of good faith in commercial 
contracts as being merely “honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction 
concerned”15.  
 
Although English and Scots law do not subscribe to general principles of good faith 
in commercial transactions, dishonesty, deliberate misrepresentation, etc are also 
proscribed in these jurisdictions.    McKendrick summarises the position by advising 
that “(m)any, if not most rules of English contract law, conform with the 
requirements of good faith and cases which are dealt with in other systems under the 
rubric of good faith and fair dealing are analysed and resolved in a different way by 
the English courts, but the outcome is very often the same”16.    
 
The contextual element can lead to some divergence between jurisdictions where 
there is a tendency towards recognising a general principle of good faith in 
commercial transactions and those which do not.  
 
In Australia, for example, where some movement in the direction of recognising a 
duty of good faith in commercial contracts is evident, the contextual element was 
explained by Einstein J in the Australian case of Aiton Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd17 
as follows:  
 
“(t)he good faith concept acquires substance from the particular events that 
take place and to which it is applied.   As such, the standard must be fact-
                                                                                                                                                  
15 UCC (1977), s.1-201(19). 
16 McKendrick, Ewan, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle’ in Forte, A D M (ed.), Good Faith in 
Contract and Property (Oxford - Portland Oregon, 1999), p.41. 
17 Aiton Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 996, [2000] ADRLJ 269. 
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intensive and is best determined on a case by case basis using the broad 
discretion of the trial court”18. 
 
In this case the context was a contractually specified negotiation and mediation 
process and the contextual content of the good faith requirement when applied to this 
was very limited and amounted only to the display of an appropriate level of pro-
active participation in the negotiation and mediation process. 
 
However, in a similar situation, English law would reject even this limited contextual 
content as a result of Walford v Miles19, where it was held that a duty to negotiate in 
good faith was unworkable in practice20.    
 
The position in English law is perhaps accurately described by Chitty when it states 
that “the modern view is that, in keeping with the doctrines of freedom of contract 
and the binding force of contracts, in English contract law good faith is in principle 
irrelevant”21.    
 
It seems, therefore, that in the context of commercial transactions, a good faith duty 
requires little more than basic honesty in any of the jurisdictions considered and does 
not require moderation of self-interest. 
 
However, where the context of the relationship goes beyond that of a commercial 
                                                                                                                                                  
18 Ibid. at p.366. 
19 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL). 
20 Ibid. at p.129. 
21 Chitty on Contracts, 28th ed., Vol. 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), p.13, para.1-019. 
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transaction, there can be a significant leap in the contextual content of good faith.   In 
relation to legal partnership which Lindley and Banks describes as “a relationship 
resulting from a contract”22 it states that “(p)erhaps the most fundamental obligation 
which the law imposes on a partner is the duty to display complete good faith 
towards his co-partners in all partnership dealings and transactions23. 
 
In this context Lord Lindley summarised the good faith duty as follows:  
 
‘The utmost good faith is due from every member of a partnership towards 
every other member;  and if any dispute arise between partners touching any 
transaction by which one seeks to benefit himself at the expense of the firm, he 
will be required to show, not only that he has the law on his side, but that his 
conduct will bear to be tried by the highest standard of honour.’”24. 
 
Lindley and Banks further advises that the duty of good faith is of general application 
and arises out of the fiduciary relationship which exists between the partners25.   It 
also takes the view that this duty is largely reflected in the provisions of s.28 of the 
Partnership Act 1890 where the partners are “bound to render true accounts and full 
information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner or his legal 
representative”26. 
 
From a Scottish perspective Miller accepts that whilst there is considerable authority 
                                                                                                                                                  
22 Banks, R C I’Anson, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th ed. (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 
1995), p.12, para.2-07. 
23 Ibid. p.483, para.16-01. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. p.484, para.16.03. 
26 Ibid. p.483, para. 16.02. 
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to the effect that partnership is a contract uberrimae fidei (ie of the utmost good 
faith), he also quotes judicial dicta which refer to ‘a fiduciary relationship’ or to ‘an 
especial degree of good faith’27.   He considers the doctrine of uberrima fides to be an 
importation into Scots law from the English law relating to disclosure of material 
facts in insurance contracts and to have limited relevance to the rights and duties of 
partners during the course of the partnership.   As in English partnership law, he sees 
these rights and duties as founded in the fiduciary nature of the relationship. 
 
The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia concludes that “partnership is a relationship of 
good faith, even if not requiring uberrima fides, and it is clear that partners are 
regarded as being in the position of fiduciaries towards the firm each other”28 
 
It seems, therefore, that it is the fiduciary nature of the partnership relationship which 
is the defining feature and this leads to the extensive content of good faith in this 
context. 
 
Legal partnership is a particularly intense fiduciary relationship and in this regard 
Lindley and Banks quotes Vice-Chancellor Bacon in Helmore v Smith29 as saying: 
 
“If the fiduciary relation means anything I cannot conceive a stronger case 
of fiduciary relation than that which exists between partners.   Their mutual 
confidence is the life blood of the concern.   It is because they trust one 
                                                                                                                                                  
27Miller, J B, The Law of Partnership in Scotland, 2nd ed., Brough, G H (ed.) (Edinburgh:  W 
Green, 1994) at p.156. 
28 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, The Laws of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995), vol.16, 
p.38, para.1057. 
29 (1886) 35 Ch D 436. 
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another that they are partners in the first instance;  it is because they 
continue to trust each other that the business goes on.”30. 
 
It is submitted, therefore, that there is perhaps not such a clear progression from the 
good faith standard to the fiduciary standards as that suggested by Finn.   Good faith 
in the context of fiduciary relationships appears to be a radically different concept 
from good faith in the context of commercial transactions, with little evidence of 
grades in between.   It also seems that in examining whether moderation of self-
interest is a legitimate expectation it is necessary to examine the agreement between 
the parties in relation to its fiduciary content rather than to attempt to assess conduct 
in relation to good faith. 
 
 
The context of joint ventures 
 
Mak has suggested that because standard construction contract forms cannot meet the 
expectations of parties to co-operative arrangements such as partnering, a project 
owner should enter into a “legally binding joint venture” with a managing contractor 
who is a ‘single delivery entity’ consisting of the constructor and consultants31.    
 
As previously explained, legal partnership is a fiduciary relationship.   A partnership 
may also exist for a “single adventure or undertaking” after which it is dissolved32.  
Lindley and Banks advises that in these cases the rights and liabilities of the partners 
                                                                                                                                                  
30 Ibid. at p.444. 
31 Mak, Bevis, ‘Partnering and Alliancing’, (2001) 17(3) Const L J 218 at p.227. 
32 Partnership Act 1890, s.32. 
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are governed by the same principles that apply to general partnerships”33.    
 
Miller devotes a chapter to the analysis of ‘Joint Adventure’ in terms of Scots law.  
He defines it as being “clearly a species of partnership, though the restricted 
purposes for which it is set up may distinguish it in practical terms from the 
partnership or firm which is established to carry on a continuing business.   These 
restricted purposes may give rise to legal consequences which are peculiar to the 
joint adventure.   These legal consequences, however, do not entail any divergence in 
legal theory from that which governs the partnership proper.”34.    
 
Arrangements termed ‘joint ventures’ may or may not constitute partnerships 
depending on the extent of the agreement.  Clearly if the joint venture relationship 
amounts to a partnership then the appropriate fiduciary obligations will be relevant.  
Even if it does not, it may still have some fiduciary content. 
 
Loke advises that, in general, “the collaborative nature of a joint venture may suggest 
that parties rely not only on their co-venturers abiding by the contractual 
stipulations, but also on their good faith in respecting the  spirit and intent of the 
collaborative venture.   These expectations may be unwritten and unspoken – but yet 
deserving of relief in the context of the relationship.”35. 
 
Loke also suggests that the use of terms such as trust and confidence may be relevant 
                                                                                                                                                  
33 Banks, R C I’Anson, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th ed. (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 
1995), p.107, para.5.73. 
34 Miller, J B, The Law of Partnership in Scotland, 2nd ed., Brough, G H (ed.) (Edinburgh:  W 
Green, 1994)  p.630. 
35 Loke, A F H, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint Ventures’, 
[1999] Journal of Business Law 538 at p.544. 
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but that the difficulty is that their meaning can be of various kinds, depending on the 
nature of the relationship.   Trust and confidence can mean merely an expectation that 
the counter-party will carry out a task competently or, more onerously, trusting the 
other party to perform obligations in good faith or, finally, expecting that the counter-
party will suppress pursuit of his own self-interest.   Consequently trust and 
confidence are inadequate to indicate a fiduciary relationship without other factors 
being present36.    
 
As a general rule he suggests that in establishing whether a fiduciary duty exists “the 
touchstone of the enquiry should be:  does the complainant have a legitimate 
expectation that the ‘obligor’ subordinate the pursuit of his self-interest to that of the 
complainant”37 and that this depends on a matrix of relevant factors which should be 
judged holistically in the context of the relationship38. 
 
The attitude of the courts is unsettled in relation to finding whether fiduciary duties 
exist in collaborative joint ventures.    In the Australian case of Hospital Products v 
United States Surgical Corporation (‘USSC’)39  Hospital Products was awarded an 
exclusive distributorship to market USSC’s products, but instead used this 
distributorship to develop and promote its own products at the expense of USSC’s 
products.  USSC attempted to establish that the distributor owed it obligations which 
were of a fiduciary nature.   This was so held by the court of first instance, but was 
subsequently rejected by the High Court of Australia which was not satisfied that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
36 Ibid. at pp.553-554. 
37 Ibid. at p.556. 
38 Ibid. at p.558. 
39 (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
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nature of the relationship required the distributor to subordinate the pursuit of his 
self-interest to that of the manufacture.   
 
Also in Australia, Sharp examined the situation in Pacific Coal Pty Ltd v Idemitsu 
Queensland Pty Ltd40 where a joint venture consisting of seven parties became 
divided on pursuing a mining project which required a government concession41.  
The parties had entered into an ‘Investigation Agreement’ to:  
 
a. investigate the feasibility of developing and exploiting deposits of coal in 
the Ensham area of the Bowen Basin in Central Queensland; and 
b. develop and exploit the area if the parties decided that this was viable. 
 
One party separately persuaded the government to grant the concession to a different 
joint venture group consisting of themselves and just one of the other parties.    They 
were then sued by the other parties for breach of an alleged fiduciary relationship on 
the basis that each party had duties: 
 
a. not to place themselves in a position where their interests conflicted with 
their duties to the other parties to the joint venture; 
b.  to account to other joint venture parties for any property, benefit or gain 
obtained as a result of the party’s position as a joint venturer; 
c. not to use their position to gain an advantage for themselves. 
 
                                                     
40 Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 21 February 1992. 
41 Sharp, Michael W, ‘Fiduciary Duties Owed by Co-venturers in a Joint Venture’ (1992) 3(9) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 321. 
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The defence argued that the parties expressly agreed that they were not partners and 
that the agreement was negotiated at arms’ length.   Consequently fiduciary 
obligations should not be imposed.   However the judge found that it was not 
necessary for the relationship to be construed as a partnership for fiduciary 
obligations to exist42.   He found that a fiduciary relationship existed as a result of the 
Investigation Agreement which meant that “the participants undertook to act so as to 
further their joint interest in the venture and not to act so as to prejudice that joint 
interest.   They placed a mutual confidence in one another and each was vulnerable 
to abuses of power by the others” 43. 
 
According to Sharp the conclusion to be drawn from this decision is that joint 
venturers who are not partners may owe fiduciary duties to one another and “the 
existence of a contract entered into at arms’ length by parties with equal bargaining 
power does not preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship”44. 
 
However he also stressed that establishing the existence of fiduciary obligations is 
based on:  “the form of the joint venture agreement; the content of the obligations 
undertaken by the parties; and the extent of the participants’ placement of mutual 
trust and confidence in one another”45. 
 
The English case of Franois Abballe (trading as G F A) v Alstom UK Ltd46 displayed 
some similar aspects to the Pacific Coal case as it also involved a situation where 
                                                     
42 Ibid. at p.323 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 (No1) 2000 WL 331020 (QBD (T&CC)) (No.1999 TCC No.48, 24 March 2000) (online) 
<http://uk.westlaw.com/result/text.wl....>(4 October 2001). 
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joint venture partners entered into an initial agreement to evaluate a project with a 
view to pursuing it further but became divided.   Here Abballe and Alstom were 
pursuing the construction of a power station in Mexico as a joint venture in which 
they would be designer and constructor respectively.   The initial agreement consisted 
of two stages.   Stage 1 required the parties to evaluate the viability of the project and 
to produce a definitive ‘Consortium Agreement’ for full-scale development of the 
project.   Under Stage 2 the parties were to develop the project subject both to being 
satisfied with the financial aspects and also entering into the Consortium Agreement 
produced in Stage 1.   Either party could withdraw if the project was not financially 
viable and Alstom decided to withdraw after the first stage, citing this as the reason.  
Abballe raised an action, part of which was for damages for termination of the project 
as a result of Alstom’s withdrawal.   He claimed that lack of financial viability was 
not the reason for Alstom’s termination and that the real reason for withdrawal was 
that Alstom had decided to pursue an alternative project of a similar nature with a 
different joint venture partner.   Abballe claimed that the details of the Consortium 
Agreement were substantially settled and that Alstom was under an obligation to 
negotiate to settle the outstanding details and to proceed to develop the project.    
 
Initially the judge was considering whether the claim as pleaded had any prospect of 
succeeding before allowing it to proceed to a full hearing.   He decided, however, that 
whilst the agreement between Abballe and Alstom had been sufficient for the 
immediate purposes of Stage 1, the definitive Consortium Agreement to develop the 
project had not been agreed   The alleged obligation to negotiate the Consortium 
Agreement was unenforceable because it lacked the necessary certainty in the same 
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sense as an agreement to agree47.   The judge explained the uncertainty in relation to 
self-interest in the following terms:  
 
“(t)he ratio of Walford v Miles appears to me to be that an agreement to 
negotiate requires a party to consider its own best interests and if it were 
enforceable it would necessarily require a party to forego those best 
interests”48.     
 
The judge therefore refused permission to proceed but did not, however, prevent 
Abballe from submitting revised pleadings. 
 
Abballe then submitted revised pleadings which claimed that the written terms of the 
initial agreement did not represent the common intentions of the parties and that the 
agreement had implied terms49.   Abballe claimed that one of these terms was that the 
project would be developed in accordance with a ‘detailed programme of activities’ 
which would be drawn up later.   This was subject to:  
 
a. the previously described right of withdrawal which was expressed in the 
contract but which Abballe also claimed could only be invoked if either of the 
parties concluded that the project was not economically viable after the 
financial analysis in stage 1.    
b. each party, if so required by the other party in good faith, entering into the 
                                                     
47 Ibid. at  pp.7-8 of 18, paras. 19-21. 
48 Ibid. at p.7 of 18 para.18. 
49 Franois Abballe (trading as GFA) v Alstom UK Ltd (No 2) [2000] WL 989503 (QBD (T&CC)) 
(No.1999 TCC No.48, 24th May 2000) (online)<http://uk.westlaw.com/result/text.wl....>(4 October 
2001).  
 19
Consortium Agreement embodying the outcome from Stage 1 of the 
agreement. 
 
However the judge rejected this argument on the basis that the agreement of the 
detailed programme of activities was essential to the implementation of the project 
and again had to be treated as an agreement to agree.   Consequently the agreement 
was again unenforceable on the basis of Walford v Miles50. 
 
In both cases the judge rejected the claim that implied good faith introduced certainty 
into the alleged duties to negotiate51.   In this respect he referred specifically to Lord 
Ackner’s view in Walford v Miles that an agreement to negotiate is uncertain because 
a court cannot be expected to decide whether, subjectively, a proper reason exists for 
the termination of negotiations, since parties are entitled to withdraw from these 
negotiations at any time and for any reason.   The concept that this could be decided 
on the basis of good faith was “inherently repugnant to adversarial position of the 
parties when involved in negotiations”52. 
 
Abballe’s Statement of Claim contained extensive references to the course of dealing 
between the parties including statements alleging Alstom’s intention to “participate 
jointly with the plaintiff (Abballe) as a promoter and equity shareholder in any 
special purpose company established in respect of the project”53.   On this basis 
Abballe further argued in his revised pleadings that a clause in the initial agreement 
                                                     
50 Ibid. at p.2 of 10, para.4. 
51 (No1) 2000 WL 331020 at p.5 of 18, para.14; (No 2) [2000] WL 989503 Judgement (No.2) at p.2 
of 10, para.4.  
52 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) at p.138. 
53 (No1) 2000 WL 331020 p.14 of 18, extracts from the Statement of Claim, para.11. 
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requiring the parties to co-operate in the evaluation of viability was subject to an 
implied good faith requirement and that the co-operation had to be genuine.       In 
relation to the implied duty of good faith to co-operate the judge accepted that 
although “(a) joint venture of this kind presupposes mutual confidence and trust if its 
factual matrix is that pleaded by the claimant (Abballe)..........(i)f that factual matrix 
is not established then the parties may be found to be at “arm’s length so such a term 
could not be implied as it would not “go without saying” for the reasons given in 
Walford v Miles” 54.   However he could not say that the arguments in this respect had 
no realistic prospect of success and therefore allowed them to proceed.  
 
The alleged duty for co-operation to be genuine was, however, rejected because it 
would add nothing to the duty to co-operate as defined by the factual matrix of the 
agreement.   It also indirectly suggested a negative aspect which could be developed 
by a claimant as an allegation of turpitude or bad faith and such allegations needed to 
plainly made55.   
 
The conclusions from the consideration of the complex pleadings in this case seem to 
be that claims based on breach of an implied duty of good faith to progress a joint 
venture are likely to be rejected on the basis that they are unenforceable agreements 
to agree.   The claimant must establish that the factual matrix of the agreement is 
such that it has fiduciary obligations which have been breached, rather than arguing 
subjectively that conduct has breached an implied duty of good faith.   This objective 
approach is justified by Steyn in the following terms: 
                                                                                                                                                  
54 (No2) 2000 WL 989503, Judgement (No2) at p.5 of 10, para.10. 
55 Ibid. Judgement (No3) at p.7 of 10, para.2. 
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“(i)t is a defensible position for a legal system to give predominance to the 
subjective intentions of the parties.   Such a policy can claim to be 
committed to the ideal of perfect individualised justice.   But that is not the 
English way.   Our law is generally based on an objective theory of contract.  
This involves adopting an external standard given life by using the concept 
of the reasonable man.   The commercial advantage of the English approach 
is that it promotes certainty and predictability in the resolution of 
contractual disputes.”56. 
 
The emphasis on the factual matrix of the agreement in Abballe v Alstom is consistent 
with Sharp’s conclusion in Pacific Coal v Idemitsu that in examining whether 
moderation of self-interest is a legitimate expectation it is necessary to examine the 
agreement between the parties in relation to its fiduciary content. 
 
These cases tend to support the assertion by Mason that “(t)he imposition of a 
fiduciary relationship in a commercial situation has been sternly resisted in the 
United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, in Australia on the ground that it is 
undesirable to allow equitable interests to penetrate commercial transactions”57.   He 
also suggests that “we appear to have witnessed the high water mark of the fiduciary 
tide in commercial relationships”58.    Consequently recognition of the right to pursue 
self-interest as the legitimate expectation in such relationships is likely to be the 
judicial preference, especially in the UK. 
                                                     
56 Steyn, J, ‘Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 113 LQR 433  at p.433. 
57 Mason, A F, ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing’ (2000) 116(Jan) 
LQR 66 at p.85. 
58 Ibid. 
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In relation to partnering arrangements the writer concluded that parties would be 
advised to rely on careful drafting of obligations if they expect these to have any 
enforceable requirement for the parties to moderate their self-interest59.   This 
conclusion seems to be equally applicable to joint ventures. 
  
The PPC2000 context 
 
PPC200060 is currently the only published standard form of multi-party partnering 
contract in the UK and it contains a range of detailed requirements for openness and 
co-operation.   By a comparative analysis of these requirements with those of 
partnership in accordance with the Partnership Act 1890, this section assesses the 
possibility of a fiduciary relationship arising as a result of the PPC2000 contract.  
 
It might seem that the PPC2000 form excludes the formation of a partnership by 
stating that “(n)othing in the Partnering Documents shall create, or be construed as 
creating, a partnership between any of the Partnering Team members.   No 
Partnering Team member shall conduct himself in such a way as to create an 
impression that such a partnership exists.”61. 
 
                                                     
59 Begg, ‘The Legal Content of Partnering Arrangements in the Construction Industry’ (2003) 8(3) 
Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 179 at p 196. 
60 The ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering (PPC2000), drafted by Trowers & 
Hamlins in association with The Association of Consultant Architects Ltd (2000). 
 
61 Ibid. clause 25.1. 
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However a partnership may exist even though the parties purport to exclude it62.   In 
this respect Lindley and Banks quotes Cozens-Hardy M R in Weiner v Harris63 as 
follows:    
 
“Two parties enter into a transaction and say ‘It is hereby declared there is 
no partnership between us.’   The court pays no regard to that.   The court 
looks at the transaction and says: ‘Is this, in point of law, really a 
partnership?’   It is not in the least conclusive that the parties have used a 
term or language intended to indicate that the transaction is not that which in 
law it is.”64. 
 
As explained by Miller, the definition of a partnership in Section 1(1) of the 
Partnership Act 1890 has three elements:  (1) a business; (2) two or more persons 
engaged in carrying on that business; and (3) a motivation on the part of those 
persons in seeking a profit65.   The concept of a business can include almost any 
commercial or professional activity66.   Clause 23.3 of the PPC2000 partnering 
contract requires the Partnering Team members to “work together ... ... ... for the 
benefit of the Project” which suggests a joint interest by two or more persons in a 
single definable business entity called ‘The Project’.   The designer, constructor, 
specialists, etc, clearly have a profit motive.   Whilst the link to profit is more tenuous 
with the client where the Project is construction of a facility for him, he would be 
                                                     
62 Banks, R C I’Anson, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th ed. (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 
1995),  pp.73-74, paras.5-04 - 5-06. 
63 (1910) 1 KB 285. 
64 Ibid. at p.290. 
65 Miller, J B, The Law of Partnership in Scotland, 2nd ed., Brough, G H (ed.) (Edinburgh:  W 
Green, 1994) at p.2.  
66 Ibid. at  p.3. 
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motivated by an expectation that the partnering relationship would result in savings in 
the cost of the Project which would effectively represent a profit.  
 
In addition Section 2(3) of the Partnership Act 1890 states that “(t)he receipt by a 
person of a share in the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a 
partner in the business”.   Consequently the provisions in the PPC2000 form of 
contract where “(t)he Partnering Team members shall implement any shared savings 
arrangements and added value incentives described in the Project Partnering 
Agreement”67 might reasonably be expected to result in a form of profit sharing 
arrangement. 
 
Consequently the features of the contract do not immediately appear to exclude the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship similar to partnership. 
 
As previously indicated, the good faith basis of a partnership is to a large extent 
reflected in the disclosure requirements in section 28 of the Partnership Act 1890 
where “(p)artners are bound to render true accounts and full information of all 
things affecting the partnership to any partner”.   The PPC2000 partnering contract 
also contains disclosure requirements including the following:  
 
• Partnering Team members are to “work together………..to achieve 
transparent and co-operative exchange of information”68  
•  constructors are to submit Business Cases for certain construction packages 
                                                     
67 Clause 13.2. 
68 Clause 3.1. 
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on an “Open-book basis”69 (where open book is defined as “involving the 
declaration of all price components including Profit, Central Office 
Overheads, Site Overheads and the costs of materials, goods, equipment, 
work and services, with all and any relevant books of account, 
correspondence, agreements, orders, invoices, receipts and other relevant 
documents available for inspection”70)  
• progress against Key Performance Indicators is to be demonstrated by 
Partnering Team Members on an “Open-book basis”71 
• early warning is to be given by each Partnering Team member “as soon as it 
is aware of any matter adversely affecting or threatening the Project or that 
Partnering Team member’s performance under the Partnering Contract”72. 
    
At first sight, despite the differences in wording, there does not seem to be a world of 
difference between the sum of these obligations of disclosure in PPC2000 in relation 
to the Project and the duty to render true accounts and full information of all things 
affecting a partnership. 
 
Furthermore in a partnership “every partner must account to the firm for any benefit 
derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction 
concerning the partnership”73.   PPC2000 has a similar disclosure requirement that 
“(e)ach Partnering Team member shall notify the client of any payment or benefit 
offered or received by it in relation to the Project other than pursuant to the 
                                                                                                                                                  
69 Clause 10.3. 
70 Appendix 1, Definitions, p.40. 
71 Clause 23.2. 
72 Clause 3.7. 
73 Partnership Act 1890, s.29. 
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Partnering Documents or a Specialist Contract”74.    
  
However the commercial aspects of the transaction are indicated by the payment 
terms.   These include ‘Consultant Payment Terms’ for the payment of Designers etc 
and an agreed ‘Price Framework’ for paying the Constructor75.   The prices paid 
under this framework are developed in accordance with a variety of rules as the 
project progresses and consultation between the parties is emphasised at every stage.   
 
A similar type of arrangement was considered in the Australian case of Thiess v 
Placer76 where a negotiated partnering contract contained a specific mechanism for 
assessing rates to be paid to a contractor for providing mining services.   The contract 
contained obligations for the ‘open book’ disclosure by the contractor of historical 
cost data which would be used as the basis for calculating these rates.   In a 
subsequent dispute over these rates the judge was not persuaded that the relationship 
up to the point at which the parties entered into the contract was a fiduciary one and 
decided that the agreement was a normal commercial transaction negotiated at arms’ 
length.    However after execution of the contract he decided that the specific 
obligations to disclose historical cost data were fiduciary in nature and required the 
contractor to act in the client’s interest as well as its own77. 
 
The implication of a relationship with fiduciary obligations similar to partnership 
would also imply a very different situation regarding the liability of the parties in 
                                                                                                                                                  
74 Clause 13.6. 
75 PPC2000, Project Partnering Agreement p.i. 
76 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 1046 (lib. no. 
990187, 16 April 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/WASC/1999/1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001). 
77 Ibid. at pp. 110-111 (of 247). 
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contract and tort/delict.   In respect of contractual liability Section 9 of the 
Partnership Act 1890 makes the partners jointly liable in England and jointly and 
severally liable in Scotland.   Section 12 makes the partners jointly and severally 
liable in both jurisdictions in tort/delict.   It has previously been submitted that in 
joint venture relationships the preference of the courts is likely to be to recognise the 
rights of parties to pursue their own self-interest.   It is submitted that the commercial 
aspects of a partnering contract suggest a less intense relationship than a joint venture 
and therefore the possibility of a relationship with the consequences of joint and 
several liability being implied into such a contract is extremely remote.  
 
Consequently, considering 
• the extent of the elements suggesting a commercial transaction negotiated at 
arms’ length 
• the attitude of the Australian court in Thiess v Placer 
• the resistance against implying even basic good faith duties into joint venture 
relationships in the UK 
• the stern resistance, particularly in the UK, against imposing fiduciary 
relationships in commercial situations 
• the step change in liability which would be involved in implying a partnership 
relationship in a commercial transaction, 
 
it is submitted that the relationship formed by the PPC2000 contract form is most 
unlikely to be construed as fiduciary in nature.    This does not, however, preclude 
individual obligations in PPC2000 from having a fiduciary content as found in Thiess 
v Placer.   
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Possible fiduciary content of obligations in PPC2000 
 
Loke suggests that in assessing whether a fiduciary obligation exists the definitional 
debate of what constitutes a fiduciary relationship should be avoided78.   The 
approach should be to focus on the interest intended to be protected by the relevant 
obligation and in what circumstances the other party is bound to regard that interest79. 
 
The PPC2000 form includes a number of clauses which refer to openness and which 
apparently require disclosure of information in a commercial context.   The extent to 
which some of these may have a fiduciary content requiring parties to act in the 
interests of other parties is considered below. 
 
The PPC2000 partnering contract requires the Partnering Team members to “work 
together………..to achieve transparent and co-operative exchange of information”80.  
Where the expectations of the parties are not fulfilled in this respect the construction 
of the terms ‘transparent’ and ‘co-operative’ in this context and the extent of the 
information expected to be disclosed may be matters for disagreement and dispute.  
The contract provides that such disputes shall be referred to a ‘problem solving 
hierarchy’81 which is defined as “arrangements for any difference or dispute to be 
referred within strict time limits to increasingly senior individuals”82 and which is to 
be specified in the contract.    In the Australian case of Aiton Pty Ltd v Transfield 
                                                     
78 Loke, A F H, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in Contractual Joint Ventures’, 
[1999] Journal of Business Law 538 at p.538. 
79 Ibid. at p.541. 
80 Clause 3.1. 
81 Clause 27.2. 
82  Appendix 1, Definitions, p.41. 
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Ltd83 whilst the judge found that participation in a specified negotiation process 
would be enforceable provided that the process itself was sufficiently certain84, he 
specifically pointed to the need for good faith in that participation because “without it 
there is no chance of reaching a mutually satisfactory conclusion”85.   However such 
a good faith requirement would be unenforceable in English law as a result of 
Walford v Miles86 and therefore the problem solving process itself would be 
unworkable and unenforceable.   Recourse to determinative dispute resolution 
processes such as  statutory adjudication, arbitration (if provided for in the contract) 
and litigation are other options.   However ‘working together……… to achieve’ 
indicates that the nature and extent of the information exchange process would have 
to be negotiated to achieve an outcome which would have the consent of both parties.  
This situation seems, therefore, to be no more than an agreement to negotiate an 
agreement which, as stated by Lord Denning, “is not a contract known to the law”87.   
 
The uncertainty of the PPC2000 provision particularly in relation to the extent of the 
exchange of information required is in sharp contrast to the requirements of the 
Partnership Act 1890 which clearly specifies the extent of disclosure as being “full 
information of all things affecting the partnership88”.   The conclusion is, therefore, 
that no enforceable obligation is likely to arise as a result of the exchange of 
information clause in PPC2000. 
 
The term ‘Open Book’ is used in PPC2000 in a number of provisions relating to cost 
                                                                                                                                                  
83 [2000] ADRLJ 269. 
84 Ibid. at p.355. 
85 Ibid. at p.365. 
86 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) 
87 Courtney and Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Bros (Hotels) Ltd, [1975] 1 WLR 297 at p.301. 
88 s.28. 
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including:  
• clause 10.3 concerning presentation of ‘Business Cases’ for the constructor to 
carry out work either himself or by his preferred ‘Specialist’ 
• clause 18.6 concerning extra cost due to delay  
• clause 23.2 in relation to the substantiation of progress by the parties against 
Key Performance Indicators 
 
The term was used in the Australian case of Thiess v Placer89 where rates for mining 
work were to be derived by “open book analyses and negotiations”90.   Whilst the 
parties in that case were not disputing the meaning of the term ‘Open Book’, the 
judge advised that he considered that it meant what it said, namely “that Thiess 
would open its books to Placer and thereby disclose the way in which it derived its 
rates for the relevant pieces of mining equipment”91.   The open book provision was 
necessary because the rates were to be based on historical data possessed by Thiess.  
In this situation the judge considered that “good faith.......... would require Thiess to 
formulate plant rates which were honestly based on the relevant historical 
data”92and that “this was in the nature of a fiduciary duty”93.   Whilst English and 
Scots law would also demand honesty, there is a greater tendency to resist the 
imposition of fiduciary obligations in these jurisdictions than in Australia.    However 
the PPC2000 clause is precise in that it states that “all price components” are 
required to be disclosed under the term ‘open book’94 and the mandatory language of 
                                                     
89 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 1046 (lib. no. 
990187, 16 April 1999) (online) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/wa/WASC/1999/1046.html?query=title…> (10 October 2001). 
90 Ibid at p.14 of 247. 
91 Ibid at p.15 of 247. 
92 Ibid at pp.98-99 of 247. 
93Ibid. conclusion No.4 at p.246 (of 247). 
94 Appendix 1, Definitions, p.40. 
 31
“shall” is used in relation to the disclosure in each case.   Consequently it is 
submitted that there would be a reasonable case for finding fiduciary content in the 
‘open book’ requirements of PPC2000.   
 
PPC2000 requires early warning to be given by each Partnering Team member “as 
soon as it is aware of any matter adversely affecting or threatening the Project or 
that Partnering Team member’s performance under the Partnering Contract”95.  
The clause indicates a disclosure requirement in the specific situation where matters 
adversely affect the Project.   It is submitted that whilst it would not be unreasonable 
to suggest that delay and extra cost, for example, would represent adverse effects on 
the Project as a whole, they may not necessarily represent adverse effects on an 
individual participant.   For example, extra cost may result in additional profit for a 
constructor.   Consequently there is an apparent duty on parties to consider the 
interests of other parties.   However the extent of the information required by the 
early warning obligation is not specified.   If this had been specified as ‘full 
information’ as required for a partnership, then this could be objectively assessed and 
might have a fiduciary content.   Consequently this clause is likely to suffer from 
similar uncertainty to that found in clause 3.1 concerning the transparent and co-
operative exchange of information. 
 
Clause 13.6 of PPC2000 requires partnering team members to disclose payments or 
benefits received other than pursuant to the Partnering Documents or a Specialist 
Contract.   The clause has significant similarities to clause 29(10) of the Partnership 
Act 1890 where “every partner must account to the firm for any benefit derived by 
                                                     
95 Clause 3.7. 
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him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction concerning the 
partnership”96.   Miller sees the Partnership Act as emphasising the prohibition of 
secret profits by placing this duty of disclosure of material facts on a partner97.  
Clause 30 of the Act then requires profits from any business of the same nature and 
competing with that of the firm to be paid over to the firm.   The PPC2000 clause 
covers the consent aspect since any benefit which is pursuant to the Partnering 
Documents or a Specialist Contract would, by its nature, already be contractually 
approved.  PPC2000 requires prior approval by the client of any other payment or 
benefit received by a party.   The disclosure of such payments may well be contrary 
to a party’s interests and therefore the obligation would appear to be fiduciary in 
nature.   Furthermore, where such payments or benefits are legitimate, it might be 
expected that they would be included under the heading of shared savings 
arrangements and/or added value incentives between Partnering Members under 
clause 13.2.   In this event the requirement for disclosure would be linked to the 
distribution of the payment or benefit between the partnering team members resulting 
in a fiduciary situation similar to partnership. 
 
The above analysis of selected clauses suggests that many of the apparent 
requirements for co-operation and openness would not result in any enforceable 
expectation that self-interest would be moderated.   This again emphasises the need 
for very careful drafting of clauses if they are intended to have this effect. 
  
Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                  
96 Partnership Act 1890, s.29. 
97 Miller, J B, The Law of Partnership in Scotland, 2nd ed., Brough, G H (ed.) (Edinburgh:  W 
Green, 1994) at p.161 
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The gulf between commercial contract relationships negotiated at arms’ length, 
where parties are entitled pursue their own self-interest, and fiduciary relationships, 
where they must moderate this in the interests of other parties, is wide and is not 
easily bridged by joint venture agreements.   There is substantial resistance to 
implying fiduciary relationships in commercial situations and therefore the factual 
matrix of the agreement must objectively demonstrate that such a relationship exists.    
        
Australian case law suggests that the same conclusion is relevant to partnering 
contracts in general.   Analysis of the specific case of the PPC2000 contract form 
suggests that its factual matrix is very unlikely to imply a fiduciary relationship. 
 
The judge in Abballe v Alstom commented that “(m)any commercial agreements 
contain well-intentioned provisions which, even when given the most favourable 
interpretation possible, prove on examination to be fatally flawed and unenforceable 
in law”98.   Analysis suggests that some of the specific provisions in the PPC2000 
form orientated towards openness and co-operation would fall into this category and 
are unlikely to result in fiduciary obligations   However certain individual 
requirements such as ‘open book’ accounting and the need for parties to disclose 
certain benefits may have enforceable content requiring one party to act in the 
interests of another.   
 
Consequently, unless drafting has been very careful, any positive expectations that 
                                                     
98(No1) 2000 WL 331020 (QBD (T&CC)) (No.1999 TCC No.48, 24 March 2000) (online) 
<http://uk.westlaw.com/result/text.wl....>(4 October 2001), p.8, para.21. 
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parties may have that fiduciary relationships or obligations requiring moderation of 
self-interest will arise in joint ventures or partnering contracts in the construction 
industry are unlikely to be realised. 
 
